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•	 For	 almost	 a	hundred	years	 (since	World	War	 I	 and	 the	dis-
integration	of	the	Ottoman	Empire)	stability	–	or	rather,	 the	
permanent	 threat	 to	stability	–	has	been	a	key	challenge	 for	
the	Middle	East.	One	of	the	central	elements	of	this	threat	has	
been	 the	 so-called	 Kurdish	 problem,	 that	 is,	 the	 issues	 that	
continually	 arise	 between	 the	 states	 of	 the	 region	 and	 the	




•	 The	 last	 decade	 has	 been	 a	 period	 of	 deep	 tensions	 and	 re-
-evaluations	 across	 the	Middle	 East,	 with	 both	 domestic	 as	
well	as	wider,	geopolitical	ramifications.	This,	in	turn,	has	led	
to	a	rapid	erosion	of	the	regional	order	that	until	now	had	en-




•	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Arab	 Spring,	 little	 attention	 has	 been	
paid	 to	 the	changes	undertaken	by	both	 the	Kurds	and	Tur-
key.	In	both	cases	the	past	decade	has	ushered	in	significant	







recent	 history:	 they	 have	managed	 to	 take	 effective	 control	
over	the	areas	they	inhabit	 in	Iraq	and	Syria,	and	they	have	

















increasingly	being	 seen	as	 an	 independent	 entity	 on	 the	 re-
gion’s	political	scene.	
























stability	and	 the	nature	of	 the	 transformations.	And	 for	 the	


















the Kurdish probleM. introduction 
The	Kurdish	problem	–	 i.e.,	 the	 deep	 and	 on-going	 tensions	 be-
tween	Kurds	 and	 the	 countries	 in	which	 the	 Kurdish	minority	
lives	(Turkey,	Iraq,	Iran,	Syria)	–	has	over	the	last	century	become	
permanently	 inscribed	 in	 the	political	 specificity	 of	 the	Middle	
East1.	To	a	greater	or	 lesser	degree,	 the	Kurds	are	actively	seek-
ing	to	expand	their	political	powers,	including	calls	for	independ-
ence.	 In	 order	 to	protect	 their	 territorial	 integrity	 and	 internal	
cohesion,	the	countries	in	the	region	have	treated	Kurdish	aspira-
tions	as	a	threat,	and	have	therefore	actively	opposed	them.	




















1	 Following	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	defeat	 in	World	War	I	 (1918),	 the	division	















































2	 Estimates	range	between	 11	and	25	million	Kurds,	with	a	 total	population	

















Iraq	 and	 Syria,	where	Kurds	 exercise	 real	 control	 over	 densely	
populated	areas.	
Over	 the	past	decade,	 the	Kurdish	 issue	has	also	become	a	 cen-
tre	point	 in	Turkish	politics.	The	AKP’s	policy	 of	 reforming	 the	
country’s	 political	 system	 (including	 a	 shift	 from	 a	 nationalist	

















Shafi’i	 school,	which	distinguishes	 them	 from	Hanafi	Turks	
and	Arabs,	as	well	as	the	new	ultra-conservative	movements	
inspired	by	Wahhabism	and	Salafism.	Others	 adhere	 to	 Im-
mami	 and	 Alevi	 Shiism,	 and	 Yazidism.	 The	 population	 is	
linguistically	 diverse	 (with	 Kurmanji	 and	 Sorani	 being	 two	
main	 dialects),	 and	 shows	 historical	 and	 cultural	 heteroge-
neity	(including	suggestions	that	Zaza	Kurds	and	Yazidis	fall	
outside	the	Kurdish	ethnic	group).	Throughout	the	twentieth	
century	 (and	especially	 in	 the	 last	 few	decades)	 the	Kurdish	

















gee	 migrations	 to	 the	Middle	 East	 and	 the	Western	 world).	 	












































ticularly	 the	 ethnic	 proportions	 in	Turkey,	which	 are	 changing	
in	Kurds’	favour),	as	well	as	continued	modernisation	(including,	
rising	 levels	of	education),	 the	growing	aspirations	of	 the	Kurd-
ish	people,	and	the	maturation	and	strengthening	resolve	of	the	
Kurdish	 elites3.	 Although	 at	 times	 complicated,	 the	 democratic	
3	 The	 two	main	 centres	 of	Kurdish	political	 activity	 are	 the	 elites	 running	






















tary	 interventions	 in	 1991	 and	 2003	 imposed	 federalisation	 and	





Kurdistan	 has	 also	 benefited	 from	 recent	 geo-political	 develop-









































to	 the	 dynamic	 development	 of	 relations	 between	 Ankara	 and	
Erbil	 (the	administrative	capitol	of	 Iraq’s	Kurdish	region)	at	 the	












the	 head	 of	 Iraqi	 Kurdistan,	Massoud	 Barzani,	 to	Washington,	
Moscow,	Doha	and		several	European	capitals,	as	well	as	the	mush-
rooming	of	foreign	consulates	in	Erbil7.
7	 The	wider	 context	 for	 today’s	 contacts	 had	 been	 created	 through	 several	
decades	of	repeated	involvement	by	Russia	(or	rather	the	former	Soviet	Un-
























federation;	however,	 it	 is	de facto	a	virtually	 independent	state).	
The	area	was	separated	politically	 from	Iraq,	and	 in	contrast	 to	







































box 3. (autonomous) region of (iraqi) Kurdistan –  
Kurdish regional Government 	
area:	 40	 643	 km2	 [the	 Kurdish	 autonomous	 region	 and	
Baghdad	 have	 so	 far	 failed	 to	 reach	 agreement	 on	 the	 sta-
tus	 of	 Kirkuk	 province	 and	 parts	 of	 Nineveh	 and	 Diyala	
districts,	 all	 of	 which	 remain	 under	 Baghdad’s	 control].	 	
population: 5.2	million	[lack	of	data	on	the	ethnic	make-up	
of	the	region;	alongside	the	strongly	dominant	Kurds,	Kurd-













led	 by	 Jalal	 Talabani	 (the	 president	 of	 Iraq).	 The	 PUK	 was	
formed	following	a	split	within	KDP;	for	many	years	the	two	
parties	were	political	rivals,	but	now	they	form	the	pillars	of	






























ish	 people	 and	 in	 its	 organisational	 skills,	 as	 evidenced	 by,	 for	
example,	 a	network	of	 local	party	offices	 in	different	 countries,	
and	a	network	of	organisations	throughout	the	Kurdish	diaspora,	
especially	in	the	EU.	The	PKK	also	has	a	very	efficient	army	sta-








has	 seized	 political	 control	 over	 Syrian	 Kurdistan	 through	 the	
Democratic	Union	Party	 (PYD).	This	 reaffirms	 the	power	of	 the	
PKK,	as	well	as	its	attractiveness	as	a	potential	ally	or	political	tool	
for	Syria	and	Iran.	






























legislature	 (Kongra	 Gel),	 the	 People’s	 Defence	 Forces	 (HPG),	







Despite	 its	 complicated	 structure,	 the	 substantial	 autonomy	of	
the	 individual	 organisations	 and	 occasional	 tensions	 and	 con-
flicts,	 the	 PKK	 remains	 a	 coherent	 and	 effective	 force,	 capa-




outside	world	 is	 limited	 to	messages	 sent	 through	his	 lawyers,	
family	members	and	visitors.	
The	PKK’s	 strong	position	 in	Kurdistan	results	 from	 the	party’s	





cially	 by	 Turkish	 forces)	 have	 proved	 ineffective.	 PKK	military	























Both	 political	 centres	 are	 competing	 for	 influence,	 but	without	


































long.	 Kurdistan’s	 problems	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 dynamics	 and	 the	
scale	of	the	events	taking	place	in	the	region.	In	Iraq,	the	brew-
ing	 conflict	 between	 the	 political	 leaders	 in	 Erbil	 and	 the	 cen-
tral	government	 in	Baghdad	has	become	more	pronounced;	 this	
is	heightening	 the	prospect	of	 a	military	 confrontation13,	which	
could	potentially	 ruin	 the	current	achievements	of	 the	Kurdish	
leaders.	In	Syria,	a	victory	for	the	opposition	(made	up	of	radical	




noeuvre.	 In	Turkey,	 the	spectacular	demonstration	of	 the	PKK’s	





































(i.e.	 their	 autonomous	 region	within	 Iraq,	 the	PKK	bases	 in	 the	
Qandil	Mountains,	or	 the	PYD-controlled	areas	 in	Syria)	would	


















iV. turKeY’s atteMpts to resolVe  
the Kurdish probleM 
When	 the	AKP	 formed	 a	 government	 in	 200215,	 Turkey	 entered	


























its	main	political	 opponents,	 and	gained	 influence	over	military	appoint-


















by	 local	 government	 officials	 in	 provinces	 inhabited	 by	 Kurds.	











lead	 to	 a	more	 active	 and	 independent	 role	 in	 the	 region,	with	
clear	 ambitions	 to	become	a	political	 leader	 in	 the	Middle	East,	
and	in	the	longer	term,	to	raise	its	status	in	relations	with	the	US,	
NATO	 and	 the	 EU18.	 The	 new	 approach	was	 to	 be	 implemented	
through	greater	openness	to	political	and	economic	ties	with	the	
countries	and	peoples	of	 the	region.	Domestically,	 the	AKP	har-
nessed	 discourses	 of	 civilisational	 ties	 (with	 the	 Islamic	world)	
and	historical	links	(dating	back	to	the	Ottoman	Empire),	which	




























tling	 of	 the	 current	 system,	which	had	 guaranteed	 the	 region’s	
precarious	 stability.	 By	 doing	 so,	 Ankara	 distanced	 itself	 from	
the	 US	 and	 effectively	 ended	 its	 alliance	with	 Israel	 (following	
a	serious	crisis	of	confidence	between	the	parties	and	persistent	
political	 tensions	 in	 bilateral	 relations,	 leading	 to	 a	 breakdown	
in	military	cooperation).	On	the	other	hand,	Turkey	established	
closer	 ties	with	Syria	and	 Iran,	 and	began	 to	work	closely	with	
non-state	actors,	 such	as	 the	Kurds,	Hamas,	and	 later	also	with	
Syria’s	armed	opposition	forces19.	The	Arab	Spring,	and	especially	
the	outbreak	of	civil	war	in	Syria	(2011),	led	to	a	further	destabi-
lisation	of	 the	 region	and	altered	Ankara’s	 relations	with	 states	











tics)	has	become	 the	 leading	market	 for	Turkish	goods	 (a	 sharp	
rise	from	$2.8	billion	in	2007	to	$8.2	billion	in	2011	made	Iraq	the	
second	 biggest	 importer	 of	 Turkish	 goods,	 after	 Germany).	 The	
same	was	 true	 for	 services	 and	 investment,	 especially	 in	 infra-
structure	projects	and	the	oil	and	gas	sector.	Energy	cooperation	
19	 After	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 to	 mediate	 between	 the	 government	 in	 Da-


























the	brewing	 conflict	between	Erbil	 and	Baghdad.	This	 is	due	 to	










ble	 embodiment	 of	 Turkey’s	 new	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 policies:	
that	is,	a	clear	break	with	its	previous	policy	paradigm	towards	
the	Kurds	and	the	neighbouring	states;	the	projection	of	economic	

















V. the crisis oF turKeY’s policY toWards 
the Kurds – neW challenGes 
Problems	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 Ankara’s	 new	 policy	 to-
wards	 the	Kurds	began	 to	appear	as	early	as	2009,	 and	became	






































































ber	 2012	 by	 groups	 of	Kurds	 held	 in	Turkish	 prisons	 (involving	
several	 hundred	 people	 altogether):	 the	 inmates	 demanded	 the	
right	to	speak	Kurdish	during	court	proceedings	and	called	on	the	















































































ports	about	 the	expansion	and	 increased	activity	of	 the	 Iranian	
spy	network	in	the	Turkish	Kurdistan	(one	of	the	spy	rings	was	
uncovered	 in	 late	 August/early	 September	 2012).	 Viewed	 from	
this	perspective,	the	rise	of	PKK	activity	in	Turkey	in	2011	would	
betray	the	PKK’s	real	intentions	towards	the	allies,	and	the	effec-





































government	 in	Damascus	 (nor	does	 it	 appear	 to	be	among	 their	








takable	 sense	 of	 power,	 Ankara’s	 rejection	 of	 this	 fact,	 and	 the	
mutual	 distrust	 and	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 recent	 developments	
render	 the	 chances	 for	 a	 resumption	 of	 a	 political	 dialogue	 be-
tween	Turkey	and	the	PKK	rather	remote	(in	both	the	Turkish	and	
the	Syrian	contexts).
27	 Syrian	 opposition	 forces	 strongly	 oppose	 the	 Kurdish	 calls	 for	 autonomy	
or	 federalism;	 Turkey’s	 direct	 influence	 over	 the	 opposition	 has	 also	 di-











































main	political	 forces,	 the	BDP	 and	PKK/KCK,	 are	 opposed	 to	 the	
AKP.	 In	 the	 current	political	 context,	 a	 repeat	 of	 the	Democratic	
Opening	 to	 the	Kurds	 is	 rather	unlikely,	 although	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
such	a	policy	could	distract	 the	Kurdish	minority	away	from	the	
PKK.	This	approach	could	also	be	reintroduced	during	future	work	




















Iraq	has	 come	under	Turkey’s	 political	 and	 economic	 influence,	
and	 elevated	Ankara	 to	 the	position	 of	 Erbil’s	 protector	 against	
Baghdad.	On	the	other	hand,	Turkey	is	becoming	hostage	to	Erbil’s	
policy	towards	Iraq	and	its	policy	towards	the	Syrian	Kurds	and	
























lead	to	 the	strengthening	of	 the	 independence	of	PKK’s	pseudo-























of	 Iraqi	Kurdistan,	 this	 outcome	would	 force	 the	Kurds	 to	 seek	
a	solution	by	engaging	with	Turkey,	and	give	Turkey	far	more	bar-
gaining	power.	However,	this	is	just	one	of	many	equally	plausible	
scenarios.	
Taking	the	above	into	account,	one	could	speak	of	a	serious	crisis	
in	AKP’s	 ‘neo-Ottoman’	policies	towards	the	Kurds:	the	problem	
has	been	exacerbated	by	both	domestic	and	international	devel-
opments,	and	opened	new	areas	of	potential	 conflict	 for	Turkey	
–	contrary	to	its	intentions	and	capabilities.	
On	the	other	hand	–	unlike	in	past	decades	–	the	situation	in	the	
region	has	been	very	dynamic,	and	the	power	struggles	and	crises	
occurring	in	the	respective	countries	have	been	widespread	and	
long-lasting,	affecting	the	region’s	geopolitical	order.	It	is	unlikely	
that	the	situation	will	stabilise	in	the	short	term;	it	is	also	impossi-
ble	to	expect	a	return	to	the	state	of	affairs	of	2010,	let	alone	2002.	
Compared	to	the	rest	of	the	region,	Turkey	is	not	only	the	strong-
est	and	most	stable	state,	but	is	also	a	nation	that	has	started	its	
own	internal	reforms	and	initiated	a	shift	in	the	region’s	geopo-
litical	order.	This	gives	reason	to	believe	that	the	current	crisis	is	
likely	to	leave	it	even	stronger.	Without	a	doubt,	the	Kurdish	issue	
remains	a	fundamental	pillar	of	Turkey’s	Middle	East	policy,	and	
an	important	element	of	its	domestic	policy;	in	this	case,	however,	
there	are	no	fast	or	easy	solutions.
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